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Summary
Prior to the Asian crisis, easy liquidity conditions contributed to credit expansion and 
overinvestment in the East Asian economies until they were hit by a deep recession. Similarly 
to the developments in the tiger economies in the nineties, CEE grew rapidly from 2001 to 
2007, due to foreign capital inflows. But the current global financial turmoil and economic 
downswing pulled the CEE economies into the maelstrom of the crisis. With the Asian 
experience in mind, the aim of this paper is to analyze whether overinvestment due to easy
liquidity conditions possibly emerged and contributed to the crisis in CEE.
Keywords: Overinvestment, Central and Eastern Europe, Monetary policy, Boom-and-bust 
cycles.
JEL: B53, E32, E44, F41, F43.
1 First, I thank Gunther Schnabl (University of Leipzig) for helping develop the idea of this paper. I am also 
indebted to Mario Rizzo (New York University) for his support. Further I thank the participants of the 
“Colloquium on Market Institutions and Economic Processes” (NYU), Martti Randveer (Bank of Estonia), the 
participants of the Bank of Estonia Research Seminar as well as the Leipzig University PhD Seminar for useful 
thoughts and ideas. I also thank two anonymous referees and the member of the editorial board for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
21 Introduction
Prior to the Asian crisis of 1997/98, easy world liquidity conditions contributed to credit 
expansion and overinvestment2 in the East Asian economies until they were hit by a deep 
recession that revealed unsustainable investment projects (Saxena and Wong 2002). Similarly 
to the tiger economies in the 90s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE3) economies grew 
rapidly from 2001 to 2007. But the current global financial turmoil and economic downswing 
pulled the CEE economies into the maelstrom of the crisis. With the East Asian experience in 
mind, the main aim of this paper is to analyze whether easy outside (EMU) liquidity 
conditions possibly triggered a credit-induced overinvestment boom that culminated in the 
current crisis in CEE.
Thus far a substantial number of papers focus on identifying how sudden liquidity 
shocks affect inflation and growth in small open economies. Therefore, several variations of 
Sims (1980)’s VAR methodology are applied throughout the literature (e.g. Mojon and 
Peersman 2003, Canova 2005 and Schneider and Fenz 2008). For CEE, for instance 
Arnostova and Hurnik (2004) find that changes in EMU liquidity conditions affect inflation in 
the Czech Republic. And Kuijs (2002) finds a quick response towards EMU liquidity shocks 
on prices in Slovakia.
Although previous research shows that liquidity shocks affect inflation and growth in 
CEE, it does not come up with an explanation of how easy liquidity conditions can build up a 
crisis potential during the boom period. To explain the emergence of a crisis, most current 
research assumes that an exogenous shock changes aggregate supply, demand or liquidity 
conditions. Then, the rational and fully informed agents adjust to the new situation. The 
2 Mal- or overinvestment labels investment projects that seem to pay-off (due to ignoring risks or excessive 
lending), but eventually do not pay-off.
3 In this paper the new member states of the European Union, except of Cyprus and Malta, are denoted as CEE.
3assumption of price stickiness allows for an adjustment period that is interpreted as a business 
cycle (De Grauwe 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007).
In contrast, Hayek (1929) and Mises (1912) argue that exuberated credit growth
causes an overinvestment boom that endogenously leads to a bust (in a closed economy). The 
central bank provides easy liquidity conditions. This allows the banking sector to hold interest 
rates artificially low, which induces a credit boom that is unsustainable in the long-run. Also 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Shiller (2000), De Grauwe (2008) and Minsky (1986) explain the 
bust endogenous to the boom. However, contrary to the Mises-Hayek overinvestment theory, 
they emphasize the need for “animal spirits”, herding or self-fulfilling prophecies (instead of 
easy liquidity conditions) for the emergence of the boom-and-bust cycle.
Robbins (1934) most prominently applies the Mises-Hayek theory to explain the 
causes of the Great Depression. Building upon this, Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) use 
quantitative tools to find evidence of whether a credit boom contributed to the Great 
Depression, approving the main arguments of the credit boom theories. For (small) open 
economies, White (2006) argues that the Mises-Hayek credit boom explanation of the 
business cycle may even be more applicable, as capital in- and outflows can bring about 
booms driven by foreign credit.
Also, McKinnon and Pill (1997) explain that buoyant foreign borrowing may cause 
overinvestment in small open economies. Certainly without reference to the Mises-Hayek 
theory, Krugman (1998a) and Corsetti et al. (1999) find overinvestment and over-borrowing 
(due to moral hazard of banks) to be causes of the Asian crisis. And more recently, Schnabl 
and Hoffmann (2008) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2009a) argue that easy liquidity 
conditions after 2001 contributed to investment booms around the world, especially in small 
open economies.
To analyze whether easy (EMU) liquidity conditions triggered a credit-induced boom-
and-bust cycle in CEE, the paper starts with an introduction of the overinvestment theory of 
4Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) that explains how overinvestment can emerge due to buoyant 
credit expansion (section 2). Then, augmenting the overinvestment theory to a small open 
economy framework shall help with understanding possible causes of buoyant credit growth 
and overinvestment in the small open economies of CEE. Section 4 provides an analysis of 
whether easy EMU liquidity conditions transferred to CEE and possibly caused a credit boom 
that culminated in the current crises. Section 5 concludes.
2 Overinvestment in closed economies
This section discusses the overinvestment theory of Ludwig von Mises (1912) and Friedrich 
August von Hayek (1929, 1935). The theory may provide an explanation for the emergence 
of overinvestment and crisis due to positive expectations and easy liquidity conditions in a 
closed (advanced) economy framework.
2.1 The Mises-Hayek overinvestment theory
Interest rate concept
In the Mises-Hayek theory the interest rate coordinates the spending plans of investors and 
households over time. When households save more today and provide capital to the investors, 
they want to consume more in later periods. Thus, investment activity goes along with saving 
activity to provide the goods needed in the future. Following Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) 
and Hayek (1929, 1935) the rate that balances savings and investment is called “natural rate 
of interest”. This rate provides the savers with the revenue that allows them to consume the 
output that is additionally produced in the future due to their willingness to forgo 
5consumption. Thus, to keep the economy in equilibrium, banks have to set money market 
rates according to the natural rate. 
Monetary causes of an overinvestment boom
According to Hayek (1929), an overinvestment boom may start with a rise in profitability of 
investment projects and positive expectations about the future income. Hayek (1929) follows 
Schumpeter’s concept of “new combinations” (i.e. innovations) as a possible cause of 
positive expectations (Hayek, 1929 [1976]: 95; Schumpeter 1912: 100-103). According to 
Schumpeter, an innovation is the result of competition, where “dynamic entrepreneurs” try to 
create an advantage over the other market participants to achieve higher profits. Other market 
participants soon realize the gains from this innovation and want to adopt it. (Schumpeter 
1928: 36).
This brings about a higher demand for capital. With capital demand (investment) 
increasing, the “natural rate of interest” rises, because capital supply and saving preferences
remain constant. Thus, to keep savings and investment in equilibrium, banks have to increase 
the money market rate in this situation. However, Hayek and Mises argue that banks have the 
tendency to expand credit too far at unchanged rates, due to competition for the greatest 
market share (Mises 1912: 409, 417, 420, 428, 430; Hayek 1976 [1929]: 99).4 This is often 
referred to as the “perverse elasticity of the banking sector.”
Theoretically, the central bank can restrict this credit expansion by constraining the 
liquidity conditions of the banks. Central banks may do this e.g. by increasing the refinancing 
costs or minimum reserve requirements for banks. This would force the banks to increase the 
money market rate which increases the cost of credit for investment projects in accordance to 
the higher demand and makes savings more attractive. On this way the economy would soon 
4 Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) found that oligopolistic competition provides incentives to not adjust prices 
straight away and may provide a theoretical model for this behavior. Further Carilli and Dempster (2001) use a 
prisoner’s dilemma framework to explain the profit maximizing behavior of investors and banks.
6be in equilibrium again. However, this is unlikely to happen. Therefore banks can widely 
expand credit in accordance to the rise in demand at unchanged rates (Hayek 1976 [1929]: 
99-103; Mises 1912: 417-430). 
Instead of constraining the banks and smoothening the credit cycle, central banks 
often see expansionary monetary policies as tools to promote economic growth. This point is 
stressed by Mises (1928, 1966) as well as by Hayek (1935). Hayek (1935) does not see the 
initial causes of the credit boom in innovations and expectations, but rather in an 
expansionary monetary policy that induces banks to lower money market rates. As the money 
market rate does not decline due to additional savings, it falls below the natural rate of 
interest. Further, the drop in money market rates induced by the central bank makes savings 
less attractive. On the other hand, investment projects that would not be lucrative under 
equilibrium interest rates become profitable. With more investment, employment and 
incomes increase; and consumption booms (Mises 1912; Hayek 1929; Hayek 1935).
Changes in the production structure5
While Hayek (1929) and Mises (1912) elaborate on the monetary causes of overinvestment 
cycles, Hayek (1935) further explains the real consequences of a credit expansion (Hayek 
1967 [1935]: VIII). Building upon Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory (1884, 1923), Hayek 
argues that the drop in money market rates changes the production structure in the economy. 
A lower money market rate brings about more “roundabout ways of production” as the 
production of capital goods becomes relatively lucrative (Böhm-Bawerk 1884: 400). This 
means that credit and resources are allocated towards the production of intermediate (capital) 
goods that cannot be consumed right away as investors assume that households save more 
and forgo consumption. These goods are used to produce consumption goods at a later stage 
of production. The investment boost brings about more employment and rising incomes.
5 Kirzner et al. (1995) provides an interesting discussion of Hayek (1935)’s Prices and Production.
7When all factors are employed, resources from the consumption sector are shifted towards the 
capital goods sector.
However, as this shift is caused by expansionary monetary policy instead of voluntary 
savings, savings did not increase and consumption activity is not reduced (Hayek 1967 
[1935]: 87-88).  When the amount of produced consumer goods remains constant or falls and 
the incomes of the consumers increase in the face of even higher consumption preferences, 
prices of consumer goods must increase (Hayek 1967 [1935]: 57; Mises 1912: 430, 431). This 
inflationary pressure is equivalent to forced savings (Hayek 1935) or wealth redistribution 
from workers (who intended to save a small amount of their income) towards investors (who 
save more) (Mises 1967, Sraffa 1932a, Garrison 2004) and cause the turn-around. The boom 
is characterized by overinvestment and overconsumption (Garrison 2006: 72).
The turn-around and crisis
Rising consumer prices signal that the production of consumer goods becomes relatively 
more lucrative. When the demand for consumption is too “urgent” to further invest in capital 
goods, resources have to be reallocated towards the production of consumer goods. Then 
previous investment plans become unprofitable. The central bank contributes to this shift by 
constraining credit expansions to counteract the inflationary tendencies (Hayek 1967 [1935]: 
90). Then the crisis is inevitable. 
During the crisis the banking sector reconsiders credit lines (Hayek 1976 [1929]: 101). 
As the rising money market rate lifts the threshold for the profitability of all previous 
investment projects, this dismantles investment projects (especially investment in capital 
goods) with an internal interest rate below the risen money market rate. At this time 
production capacities become useless. Plants and durable goods may only be sold with losses 
and become unprofitable (Hayek 1967 [1935]: 96). Overinvestment dismantles. Previous 
overconsumption turns into abstinence of consumption as the losses due to mal-investment 
8have to be digested. A recession follows which will be the deeper the larger the “exuberance” 
has been.
As overinvestment is dismantled, other investment projects may become unprofitable 
as general demand declines (negative multiplication effect). Thus the natural interest rate 
starts to fall. At the same time banks suffer from credit defaults due to malinvestment. Credit 
supply is constrained and rates for new investment projects are high. In this situation the 
money market rate is above the natural rate. This aggravates the downturn. 
Policy implications
“In times of crisis central banks should give increased accommodation and extend thereby 
their circulation in order to prevent panics” (Hayek 1967 [1935]: 109). Thus, lowering the 
money market rate in accordance with the natural rate is necessary to beware the economy of 
serious disturbances and counteract a secondary deflation. However, further expansionary 
monetary or fiscal policies are not seen as useful tools to accelerate the recovery of the 
economy.
Instead, Mises and Hayek argue that the structural adjustment after the turnaround is a 
necessary prerequisite for the next boom after the slump. The “crisis will heal the market”
(Mises 1912: 431) as it separates profitable investment projects (with high internal interest 
rates) from investment projects with low profitability (low internal interest rates). In a crisis, 
market participants restore the disequilibrating effects of an expansionary credit policy to 
equilibrium. This implies the existence of an internal impulse towards equilibrium (Rizzo 
1990). Without such a cumbersome process, investment projects with low internal interest 
rate would be maintained, the necessary restructuring would be postponed, and the following 
upswing would not be sustainable.
The general policy implication for central banks is to hold market rates close to the 
“natural rate of interest” and closely watch the liquidity conditions of the banking sector to 
9safeguard the economy against volatility and severe crisis. The longer market and natural 
rates differ, the bigger the catastrophe (Mises 1912: 436).
2.2 Applicability of the theory
Critical assessment of the theory
Keynes and Sraffa most prominently criticized the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory. 
According to Keynes a policy induced monetary expansion does not necessarily go along 
with more investment; instead additional money could be used to digest losses. Further he 
claims that investment and saving activity may also diverge without changes in the interest 
rate, f.i. due to changes in investment rates or liquidity preferences (Kirzner et al. 1995: 92). 
Sraffa (1932a) criticizes the theory of not being consistent in itself. The turn-around 
due to forced savings (theft) or inflation is not consistent with Hayek’s idea of a return to 
equilibrium as it causes a lack of consumption. Further, Hayek’s assumptions are too strong, 
as he abstracts from debts, contracts, wage and price rigidities. In general Sraffa finds the 
Austrian capital theory to be wrong and misleading (Kirzner et al. 1995: 96; Sraffa 1932b:
45).6
Not only Hayek’s opponents criticized the theory. For instance, Hawtrey (1932: 125) 
and Kaldor (1942: 359) explain that introducing the capital theory and changes in the 
production structure rather weakened the Mises-Hayek theory of the business cycle. Further 
Lachmann (1940: 180-181) argues that Hayek (1935) puts too much emphasis on the changes 
in the production structure. Also, the assumption of full employment in the boom is 
counterfactual to reality. According to him, expectations play a major role in business cycle 
theory as outlined by Schumpeter’s (1939) “Business Cycles” (Lachmann 1940: 180; 1943).7
6 Heinz Kurz explains the Keynes/Sraffa – Hayek controversy in more detail (In Kirzner et al. 1995, 89-105).
7 There are several other critics of the theory, e.g. by Friedman (1969) and Krugman (1998b). They consider the
theory to be wrong.
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Applicability
The critics weaken the applicability of the theory as they show that the mechanisms that lead 
to boom-and-bust cycles, as described by Mises and Hayek, may not always be the similar. 
Therefore different crises may have different explanations. Especially, Hayek’s (1935) capital 
theoretic explanation of the turn-around and bust seems to be problematic. Therefore, newer 
research that builds upon Mises and Hayek complements (Cowen 1997; Garrison 2006) the 
capital theory with the idea of marginal investment projects and different risk levels of 
investment to improve its applicability. Accordingly, policy can induce credit expansion that 
allow for riskier projects to be undertaken (Garrison 2006: 107-122).
Despite the critics, the theory seems to be applicable in many instances.8 Eichengreen 
and Mitchener (2003) finds that the “credit boom theories” of the business cycle have
explanatory power for the emergence of the Great Depression. Also Oppers (2002) argues 
that there are still lessons to be drawn by the Mises-Hayek theory as the crises in Japan in the 
1980s and 90s as well as the dot-com bubble include some features similar to their theory.
And according to White (2006), in small open economies capital in- and outflows increase the 
likelihood of Mises-Hayek credit cycles.
Most recently the emergence of the US housing bubble and its later corrections are
reminiscent of the monetary theories of Hayek (1929) and Mises (1912). Taylor (2008) and 
Diamond and Rayan (2009) explain that the primary cause of the boom in the housing market 
was accommodative monetary policy of the Federal Reserve. Acemoglu’s (2009: 190) 
explains that the loss of GDP was probably “unavoidable anyway, given the overexpansion of 
the economy in prior years.” But the economy returns to equilibrium as “within a decade or 
two, we may see modest but cumulative economic growth that more than outweighs the 
8  Countries that see large capital inflows and current account deficits like emerging Europe, Spain and the US 
see both overinvestment and over-consumption in the boom. On the other hand, in countries like Germany, f.i. 
(car industry) malinvestment  and (domestic) under-consumption may provide a better explanation of the 
crisis. Therefore polcy implications may differ.
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current economic contraction.” Therefore Acemoglu (2009) draws similar lessons for policy
as Mises and Hayek. He explains that “the preoccupation of economic theory with economic 
growth offers a cautionary note against overreacting to the crisis.”
3 Overinvestment in small open economies
Mises and Hayek explain the causes of overinvestment in a closed (advanced) economy
framework. They stress that it is the fall of the money market rate below the natural rate that 
causes the cycle. In this part the theory is augmented to small open economies by introducing 
more recent research to help with explaining the causes of buoyant credit growth and 
overinvestment in a small open (emerging market) economies.
3.1 Foreign credit and overinvestment
Foreign credit and growth
With closed capital markets, entrepreneurs can only raise money from domestic banks. In this 
context underdeveloped financial markets in emerging market economies are by definition 
characterized by high interest rates and risk (original sin) (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). 
Therefore the expected return of planned investment projects has to be high to be realized. 
According to overinvestment theories of Mises and Hayek the investment activity is sluggish 
in this scenario.9
Free access to international capital markets lowers money market rates and thereby 
accelerates investment and growth (McKinnon 1997). In this scenario, lower interest rates 
9 The CEE economies faced an even greater problem. They had no market economy, needed to accumulate 
capital (Böhm-Bawerk 1884).
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from abroad can boost investment. Low world interest rates promote investment in the 
domestic market because they are tantamount to lower costs of investment, as investors can 
use foreign savings to finance projects in the domestic market. Due to capital inflows the 
interest rate level converges towards the international level (plus a risk premium).10
According to Mises and Hayek this drop in interest rates must initiate an upswing. 
Figure 1 explains the effects of opening capital markets for instance for the CEE 
economies. It shows that after opening capital markets world liquidity conditions, especially 
EMU interest rates, affect investment decisions in CEE. When borrowing from abroad capital 
supply in CEE increases as foreign savings become available via capital imports. On the other 
hand, as the CEEC are relatively small, they do not affect capital supply in the EMU. Thus, 
capital inflows lower interest rates in CEE. Investment projects in CEE can be financed with 
capital at the cost of imEU (plus a risk premium). The investment activity increases. The catch-
up process starts.
[Figure 1]
This is equivalent to a drop of interest rates in the closed economy framework of Hayek and 
Mises, which allows for additional investment especially in investment goods. Similarly to a 
credit expansion of banks in a closed economy, the interest rate drop will bring about lower 
saving preferences and higher consumption preferences of households. As in a small open 
economy where goods are available via imports, the current account balance turns negative. 
In this case, households borrow against future income (McKinnon and Pill 1997). But 
because the capital stock of economies in the catch-up process grows, the marginal rate of 
capital declines and the economic growth rates converge towards the level of the advanced 
economy. Thus the natural rate declines as well. 
10 This is only true, if return on investment are higher. Capital market imperfections and high risks of investment 
may hinder capital mobility and even reverse capital flows (Lucas 1990). 
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Due to higher production and income, investors are able to repay foreign credit lines 
in the future unless malinvestment is made. Thus, the short-term drop in savings is not 
troublesome. The current account deficit rather reflects an intertemporally efficient allocation 
of resources (McKinnon and Pill 1997), bringing about higher production, wages and savings 
in later periods. Hence, free access to international capital markets increases investment and 
growth.
Foreign credit and overinvestment
Overinvestment in a small open economy is likely to emerge if world interest rates are “too 
low” (below their natural rate). Central banks in advanced economies may contribute to this 
by holding interest rates too low. Further, the credit creation of banks which is widely 
independent from the money supply of central banks may cause excessive liquidity 
conditions. Then capital flows can transfer easy world liquidity conditions to a small open 
economy, e.g. via foreign credit. This may bring about boom-and-bust cycles along the long-
term growth path (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008) as outlined by Mises and Hayek for a closed 
economy.
Overinvestment driven by buoyant capital inflows is most likely in the presence of 
positive expectations about the future returns from investment (high expected internal interest 
rates) in the small open economy. In this situation the volatility risk of the small economy is 
often neglected and banks finance riskier investment projects (Saxena and Wong 2002; 
Cowen 1997). Further, moral hazard (e.g. guarantees by central banks) may signal lenders too 
high pay-offs and lead them to finance additional investment projects (McKinnon and Pill 
1997; Corsetti et al. 1999; Garrison 2006: 121). This causes over-borrowing of households 
and investors, increases consumption and decreases savings below a point that is sustainable. 
Then the economy faces overinvestment, overconsumption and unsustainable current account 
deficits (McKinnon and Pill 1997). 
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Some evidence
For instance in the 1990s, over-optimism about the future growth-path and false fiscal policy 
were incentives for neglecting the volatility risk and for rising credit demand in the small 
open economies of East Asia. The availability of cheap U.S. and Asian monies allowed for 
exuberate credit growth and over-borrowing (Saxena and Wong 2002). In the mean time, 
central banks implicitly guaranteed the banks to act as a lender of last resort in case of default 
and crisis. Therefore banks ignored risks of default because they believed that possible losses 
would be covered by an insurance system (Krugman 1998a, Corsetti et al. 1999). Thus, an 
artificially lowered risk premium further reduced the costs of capital for investors, and capital 
investment, especially in real estate and construction, boomed. Overinvestment emerged.11
This is in line with the augmented Mises-Hayek explanation. Here, risk-taking contributed to 
more investment, especially in capital goods.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve provided low cost liquidity as it kept interest rates “too 
low for too long” after the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001, contributing to excessive 
borrowing and the US housing market bubble (Taylor 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 2007, 
Diamond and Rajan 2009). The Fed’s overreaction accompanied by loose regulation further 
led to dollar carry trades to markets around the world, especially in 2005 and 2006 
(McKinnon and Schnabl 2009a) and translated to monetary expansion worldwide. Especially 
countries that pegged their currencies to the dollar experienced foreign reserve growth, and 
thus monetary expansion. But also the ECB that tried to prevent the euro from appreciating 
too much, reluctantly followed the US monetary expansion until 2006 (Belke and Polleit 
2006; Hoffmann 2009).
Additionally, new unregulated financial products (derivatives) seemed to allow for 
unlimited credit creation at unchanged rates as banks could pass on the risks of investment via 
11 This is caused by “too big to fail” policies of central banks in case of default Other implicit 
insurance systems are IMF bail-outs.
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AAA rated derivatives to investors worldwide (Diamond and Rajan 2009). Thus, the 
investment activity further increased. In the Mises-Hayek theory this lifted the natural rate 
above the respective money market rate and can be interpreted as signs of the “perverse 
elasticity of the banking sector.” With central banks losing control over liquidity conditions, 
global excess liquidity after 2001 led to credit growth, inflation and real estate booms in 
several markets (Belke et al. 2008). This contributed to hiking asset prices around the world 
(Borio 2008), in particular in new and emerging markets as additional liquidity is likely to 
“vagabond” to the high-yielding markets (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008).
3.2 Exchange rate regime and overinvestment
The emergence of overinvestment due to capital inflows in a small open economy largely 
depends on its exchange rate regime. Under both, fixed and flexible, exchange rate regimes, 
overinvestment cycles can emerge, although causes and transmission differ. 
Fixed exchange rates may attract capital inflows as the exchange rate risk seems to 
diminish (Fischer 2001). If this risk is not taken into account, foreign investment and 
borrowing only depend on the interest rate differential with the anchor economy. Speculative 
capital flows to countries with fixed exchange rates should increase their exchange reserves 
as well as stock and real estate prices. Overinvestment may also emerge if banks borrow 
money denominated in foreign currency to give it to the domestic investors, without 
consideration of the exchange rate risk. According to Herzberg and Watson (2007) hard pegs 
“accelerate the expansion of un-hedged borrowing in foreign currencies.” Thus, banks have 
incentives to expand credit lines too far as in the closed economy framework of Mises and 
Hayek. Maturity mismatches enhance the danger of a crisis due to overinvestment.12
12 This was the case in the run-up to the Asian crisis.
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Further, in currency board arrangements, monetary expansions of the anchor economy 
directly transfer into monetary expansions in the anchoring economy. Therefore, an 
asymmetric shock in an anchor economy can bring about an overinvestment boom in small 
open economies with a currency board. If the small open economy is in a boom and the 
anchor economy experiences a cyclical downturn, the optimal money market rate (natural 
rate) in the small economy is higher than in the anchor economy. This can fuel the boom in 
the small economy and bring about investment that only pays-off until interest rates in the 
anchor economy start to increase. But if business cycles are highly synchronized, as in the 
case of CEE and the euro area (Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006), this scenario is rather unlikely.
On the other hand, flexible exchange rates can induce speculative investment due to 
“one-way bets” on appreciation, especially in economies that are in the process of catching-
up (McKinnon and Schnabl 2009b). “One-way bets” on appreciation may then endanger price 
stability in volatile small open economies (Merza 2004). Furthermore, if banks anticipate that 
the domestic currency appreciates due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, they may borrow at 
low interest rates in the currency of the anchor economy and convert this money into 
domestic currency. When the domestic currency appreciates, the value of foreign liabilities 
declines (in terms of domestic currency). In this situation, the central bank faces the 
revaluation loss and allows for more speculative investment and consumption of the private 
sector (Schnabl 2008a). Herding behavior can make appreciation expectations reinforcing and 
bring about a highly overvalued currency (Schnabl 2008a).13
In both exchange rate strategies, the volatility of the economy increases with the 
amount of capital attracted. Therefore most emerging market economies intervene in the 
foreign exchange market and accumulate reserves to safeguard the economic stability, even 
though they announce the exchange rates to be flexible (Schnabl 2008a). When reserves are 
accumulated, capital inflows translate into additional monetary expansions. Thus, the money 
13 In periods of contraction this effect is well-known. During the Asian crisis 1997/98 investors expected a 
strong depreciation and withdrew capital.
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market rates fall below the natural rate. Following Hayek and Mises the monetary expansion 
eases credit conditions for the banking sector and translates into additional credit to the 
private sector, due to the competition among banks. The credit boom is characterized by 
falling interest rates and a rising number of low-yielding investment projects.
In both cases imports increase relative to export. On the one hand, exuberate capital 
inflows to economies that peg their currency to an advanced economy translate into higher 
wages and inflation (Schnabl and Ziegler 2008), improving the purchasing power of 
consumers in the small open economy. On the other hand, under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, the purchasing power increases relatively as the domestic currency appreciates. Both 
transmission channels lead to an appreciation of real exchange rates (De Grauwe and Schnabl 
2005). As in the theory of Hayek and Mises, savings are unlikely to increase with declining 
interest rates. Therefore the wealth effect from overinvestment contributes to higher
consumption and increases imports as they become relatively cheaper. Thus, in both cases, 
imports tend to increase relative to exports due to the capital inflows into the economy. 
Overinvestment is followed by overconsumption. Thus, overinvestment cycles can emerge 
under either exchange rate regime.14
4 Easy liquidity and overinvestment in CEE
In this section, an empirical analysis shall provide evidence of whether easy liquidity 
conditions in the EMU affected liquidity conditions in CEE as suggested in section 3. 
Furthermore, it is elaborated, whether a credit-induced overinvestment boom possibly 
emerged in CEE (in the sense of the augmented Mises-Hayek theory).
14 Empirically the transmission over fixed exchange rates is more pronounced.
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4.1 Impact of easy EMU liquidity conditions on CEE
Foreign capital inflows and liquidity conditions in CEE
After the burst of the dot-com bubble capital flows to CEE increased due to two reasons: 
First, positive growth expectations attracted FDI as well as portfolio investment from 
international investors financed at the cost of low world interest rates. Second, as most banks 
in CEE are foreign owned, they were considered to be safe lenders. For instance in Estonia, 
Swedish banks dominate the banking sector. Similarly, Austrian banks play a significant role 
in Hungary. This domination of western subsidiaries and foreign owned banks raised the 
credibility of the financial sector and allowed for an easy access to international capital 
(Ehrlich et al. 2002, Sepp and Randveer 2002). Both, FDI and foreign owned banks seemed 
to provide an insurance against financial instability. 
Foreign borrowing of banks increased in CEE, because the interest rate spread 
between the euro area and CEE was high (Figure 2 and 3). This was especially the case after 
2002 when world interest rates were abnormally low (Taylor 2008, Lombari and Sgherri 
2007) and CEE improved its macroeconomic stability as a prerequisite for EU accession. 
Foreign borrowing brought about falling lending rates and a dependency on foreign credit. 
The banking sector passed on the currency risk from borrowing in euro to the private sector.
The capital inflows squeezed the spread between deposit and lending rates in CEE close to 
the spread in the euro area (Figure 4). This provided an incentive to take higher risks to both 
borrowers and lenders.
Although the exchange rate risk adds to the risk premium, the falling lending-loan rate
spreads (that can be seen as measures of risk) reflect that investors neglected this risk as EU 
membership and guaranteed euro adoption seemed to make depreciations unlikely (Figure 4).
The exclusion of the risk further lowered loan rates. Therefore, especially in countries with 
exchange rate pegs, interest rates converged towards the EMU level (Figure 2) In Estonia the 
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interest rate differential to the euro area was close to zero after 2004. In Poland the 
differential disappeared after joining the EU. The increases of the share of banks’ foreign 
liabilities after 2003 reflect this interest rate convergence (Figure 3). This provides evidence 
of a transmission of EMU liquidity conditions and interest rates to the small open economies 
in CEE.
[Figure 2] [Figure 3] [Figure 4]
Transmission of easy liquidity conditions in the EMU to CEE
Granger causality tests can help with finding evidence of a transmission of easy liquidity 
conditions from the EMU to CEE (Granger 1969). Following the augmented overinvestment 
framework, easy liquidity conditions are a deviation of the real money market rate from the 
natural rate. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the deviation 
of the real money market rate from the natural rate in the EMU does not Granger Cause the 
deviation in the NMS. If the test rejects the null, this provides evidence of a transmission of 
easy liquidity conditions. The Schwartz criterion is used to select the correct lag length for the 
Granger causality test.
For the analysis, monthly data is taken from the International Financial Statistics of 
the IMF provided by the Reuters EcoWin database. The data set starts in 1998 as before data 
(government bond yields) is hardly available. However, for most countries the data set even 
starts only in 2002. This is sufficient for our test as the transmission of easy money from the 
EMU to CEE is argued to have started in the aftermath of the bursting internet bubble and 
accelerated when the countries joined the EU. The data includes money market rates, long-
term interest rates and consumer price inflation for the NMS and the EMU, respectively. The 
real money market rate is calculated by subtracting consumer price inflation from the money 
market rate for each economy.
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The calculation of the natural rate can be troublesome. Woodford (2000) defines 
Wicksell’s natural rate to be the real interest rate that yields price stability. Following 
Williams (2003) the natural interest rate can be approximated by the average long-run real 
interest rate if inflation and time preference are more or less stable. This rate then largely 
depends on the trend of the real growth of an economy. However, then the natural rate would 
be a constant. To allow for structural changes (in time preferences, trend growth), which can 
have an impact on the natural rate of interest, I construct a natural rate following Keeler 
(2001) and Mulligan (2002; 2006) who consider that the observed long-term rate
(government bond yield) is a good proxy for the natural interest rate.
Thus the natural rate is equal to a weighted average of short-term rates plus a risk 
premium. Easy liquidity conditions should then increase the gap between long-term and 
short-term interest rates in the period from 2002 to 2006 as a monetary expansion or more 
risk-taking lowers short-term rates. Long-term rates, on the contrary do not directly go along 
with the cycle (Keeler 2001). The gap opens at the beginning of the credit boom. When the 
gap closes and becomes negative, we see a recession. At the 10 percent significance level, the 
Dickey-Fuller test does not identify unit roots in the calculated gaps.
The Granger causality test widely approves that the gap in the EMU Granger causes
the gaps in the CEE economies for this sample (Table 1). Only for Estonia and Slovenia, the 
causality must be rejected. This is surprising, as both economies have stable exchange rates to 
the euro since 2004. Slovenia introduced the euro in 2007. Thus the countries directly follow
possible monetary expansions in the euro area. Further, in two cases (Hungary and Czech 
Republic) the causality seems to be two-sided. 
[Table 1]
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When adjusting the sample to the most interesting period from 2002 to 2007, also the 
Slovenian and Estonian gaps are Granger caused by the gaps in the EMU. Therefore easy 
liquidity conditions from the EMU, as defined here, transferred to the CEE economies.
Further, Table 2 provides more evidence of the direction of liquidity transmission. The money 
market rates in all new member states, except of Romania, are Granger caused by the EMU 
rates. For some countries this is only true after 2001, as they pegged their currencies to a 
currency basket beforehand. 
[Table 2]
4.2 Possible signs of an overinvestment cycle
The credit boom?
Capital inflows and increased foreign borrowing of banks went along with high growth in 
output and credit. They were reflected by large current account deficits, especially in the 
economies with exchange rate pegs, as higher incomes were spent on foreign goods. Figure 5 
shows that in the CEE economies credit to the private sector as share of all assets has 
increased strongly after 2002. Similarly, credit to the private sector as percent of GDP 
increased especially in countries with pegs to the euro. Further, the credit-deposit ratios of 
banks in 2007 are high above their past averages, especially in the Baltics, Romania and 
Bulgaria (Figure 6). This indicator can be seen as a financial deepening indicator but also as a 
sign of more risk-taking by banks (Beck et al. 2000).
[Figure 5] [Figure 6]
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Following the augmented overinvestment framework, these are the typical ingredients of a 
credit-induced overinvestment boom. Accordingly, a substantial number of studies stressed
the danger of excessive credit growth, current account deficits and overheating for stability in 
the CEEC prior to the current crisis. (Egert and Backe 2006, Sopanha 2006, Duenwald et al. 
2005, Mendoza and Terrones 2004, Hoffmann and Schnabl 2007, Bini-Smaghi 2007, Schnabl 
2008b).
However, there is a broad consensus that credit booms are hard to spot before the 
event of the crisis, because high growth rates of output and credit to the private sector may 
also be justified by financial deepening (Beck et al. 2000), new technology, institutional 
change (as explained by Hayek and Schumpeter) or - as in the case of CEE - the accession to 
the EU and the expectation of euro adoption. Thus, large credit growth itself does not provide 
ex ante evidence of a credit boom (Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003, 15), even though loose 
credit conditions and credit growth are prerequisites of a credit boom. Eichengreen and 
Mitchener (2003) use three measures for an ex post quantitative analysis of whether an 
overinvestment may have occurred prior to the Great Depression: 1. the development of asset 
prices, 2. the investment/GDP, and 3. the money/GDP ratio. These indicators are analyzed in 
the following:
First, Figure 7 shows that share prices (broad index from the IMF statistics) increased 
in all CEE economies especially after 2001 when credit growth increased and interest rates 
were low. In Figure 7 the development in Poland, Estonia and Romania is shown as 
representatives for the different exchange rate strategies. Since 2007 share prices have been 
falling sharply. The share price index follows the Eichengreen-Mitchener scheme for a credit 
boom.
[Figure 7]
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Second, the development of the investment/GDP ratio is illustrated in Figure 8 using data of 
quarterly capital formation. It indicates an increase of this ratio up to 2007 in Romania and 
Estonia, representing the countries with rather fixed or pegged exchange rates. In countries 
with flexible exchange rates such as Poland this cannot be found, even though the
investment/GDP share increased after 2004 in accordance with the interest rate convergence. 
Hungary, which is not in the graphs, is an exception. Troubled by instability the 
investment/GDP ratio did not increase, although share prices in Hungary have a similar trend 
to those in the other CEE economies. As increases in credit and investment were most 
pronounced among countries with tight pegs to the euro, e.g. the Baltic States, Bulgaria and 
Slovenia, exchange rate pegs contributed to higher investment and growth rates in CEE 
countries from 1994 to 2007 (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2009, Schnabl 2008b). 
Interestingly, as explained by Hayek (1935) additional investment went along with an 
increase in construction and a boom in the real estate sector in most CEE economies. Further 
the production of capital goods increased relatively to the production of consumer goods.
This may signal a change in the production structure caused by easy credit conditions as 
explained by the overinvestment theories (see Figure 9). Due to the prior increase, also the 
fall in the production of capital goods in the crisis is more pronounced.
[Figure 8] [Figure 9]
Following Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) a rising money/GDP ratio is the third indicator 
for an overinvestment boom in the sense of the Mises-Hayek theory. Figure 10 illustrated that 
the money/GDP share increased in all CEE economies during the boom. Especially from 
2003-2007 the money/GDP share grew rapidly as capital inflows caused a fast accumulation 
of reserves in all CEE economies (that translated into additional monetary expansions). 
Figure 11 shows that countries with more flexible exchange rates did not stay behind 
24
exchange rate stabilizers in accumulating reserves. Countries with de jure intermediate 
exchange rate regimes like Romania and Slovakia even experienced the fastest reserve 
accumulation. In accordance with the reserve accumulation, real appreciation accelerated in 
all new member states. Figure 12 indicates that there was no difference between the countries 
with flexible and fixed exchange rates. Although nominally the exchange rate was stable, for 
instance in Estonia, capital inflows led to wage and (asset) price increases, which appreciated 
the currency in real terms during the boom period.
[Figure 10] [Figure 11] [Figure 12]
The construction of a composite indicator of the three credit boom indicators may provide 
evidence of an interrelation of the credit boom indicators (Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003; 
Borio and Lowe 2002). Therefore the deviation of the money/GDP and investment/GDP 
ratios as well as of the development of share prices (growth) from their HP trend are added
with equal weights for the average share prices growth, money/GDP and investment/GDP 
ratios in CEE. Figure 13 indicates that after 2005, the composite indicator signals a credit 
boom. Figure 14 shows the development of each indicator separately. As share prices seem to 
fluctuate heavily, even though they provide the same notion, the composite indicator without 
shares is constructed as well. The indicator widely remains unchanged. This provides ex post 
evidence in favor of the strand of literature that warned from overheating pressure in CEE due 
to credit booms since 2005, such as Egert and Backe (2006), Sopanha (2006), Duenwald et al. 
(2005), Mendoza and Terrones (2004) and Hoffmann and Schnabl (2007).
[Figure 13] [Figure 14]
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The turn-around and downswing
According to the overinvestment theory, the pick up of inflation is the first indicator for 
overheating pressures (Figure 15) and brings about the turn-around. Similarly in CEE, the 
increase in inflation was followed by a bust. While until 2004 countries with fixed exchange 
rates outperformed countries with flexible exchange rates, inflation increased in these 
countries from 2005 to 2007. At the same time inflation in the euro area increased. This
dampened the macroeconomic outlook and thereby the stability of the markets, especially 
after the ECB started to raise interest rates due to inflationary pressure in 2006. Then asset 
prices and credit growth stagnated. This provides evidence in favor of an unsustainable credit 
boom.
 [Figure 15]
Additionally, the emergence of the crisis in the US in 2007 and its transmission to Europe led 
to higher interest rates and falling output as investors invest less in emerging markets when 
they need liquidity in the safe havens. Due to fewer capital inflows the CEE economies faced 
a strong depreciation pressure. Therefore, the risk premium for investment projects increased 
dramatically. Thus, the lending-deposit rate spread increased from 2007 to early 2009. The 
inclusion of the risk raised costs of investment (volatility and exchange rate risk). Interest 
rates increased (Figure 2). Therefore many investment projects that seemed profitable before 
were not sustainable anymore. The investment activity stagnated and asset prices fell. (Figure 
8).
Because less capital is available at higher costs, the countries in CEE see a strong 
contraction and real depreciation in the current crisis. In countries with fixed exchange rates, 
wages have to decline to keep up competitiveness. For instance in Estonia, where wages are 
relatively flexible, a wages cut is expected for 2009. Countries with rather floating exchange 
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rates like Poland depreciated strongly to adjust to the new situation. In this case, repaying 
credit lines denominated in euro becomes more expensive. Up to now, the crisis has hit Latvia 
and Hungary the most. They have had to ask for IMF money because of rising deficits 
bringing the countries close to insolvency.
5 Economic policy implications
This paper has focused on explaining how overinvestment due to easy liquidity conditions in 
the EMU and buoyant (foreign) credit growth can emerge in the small open economies of 
CEE. The empirical analysis has provided evidence in favor of a liquidity transmission from 
the EMU to CEE. At the same time there are some signs of a credit boom prior to the current 
crisis. This may signal overinvestment in the sense of the Mises-Hayek theory which may 
have endogenously contributed to the cyclical downturn.
Policy Implications
To lower the probability of economic turmoil in the future and cope with the current crisis the 
following policy implications arise from the paper, even though I am aware of that there is 
not a full insurance against speculation and false risk assessment:
First, as outlined by the overinvestment theory, the money market rate has to be close 
to its natural rate to reduce the risk of overinvestment cycles in the EMU and CEE, 
respectively. Thus, credit creation (banking sector) has to be brought under control by 
improved risk assessment and supervision. From this perspective, the current measures for a 
better supervision of the banking sector and the ECB paying attention to monetary aggregates 
provide hope for the future. But as credit creation may increase widely without additional 
money supply from the central bank, future monetary policy models could consider taking 
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into account asset prices and credit aggregates (Borio 2008), or departing from assumptions 
of perfect information of the banking sector (Lombari and Sgherri 2007) to improve the 
prediction of future natural rates and keep credit conditions under control. 
Second, from Mises’s and Hayek’s point of view, policy-induced credit expansions 
are not adequate to counteract a crisis as they delay the structural adjustment and prevent the 
reallocation of resources. Likewise, the events during the Asian crisis and following the dot-
com bubble show that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies may cause moral hazard of 
the private sector, new distortions and new overinvestment cycles (Saxena and Wong 2002, 
Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008). In this sense, the current Bundesbank/ECB strategy is 
promising as it seems to acknowledge these findings when Jürgen Stark (member of the 
executive board of the ECB) announced that “the financial crisis can’t be solved with rate 
cuts” because “the lower rates are the less incentive banks have to clean up their balance 
sheets and carefully monitor their credit risks” (Bloomberg 2009). Furthermore, Axel Weber 
(2008) argues that in the future liquidity conditions have to be restricted as they were 
loosened in the crisis (more symmetrically than before) to lower the probability of new 
bubbles or inflation.
Third, as the CEE countries with floating exchange rates have seen strong 
depreciations and thereby raising foreign debts in the current crisis, exchange rate stabilizers 
should try to keep the peg to prevent their economy from further credit defaults. The IMF 
further promotes a fast euro adoption (The Baltic Times 2009). Instead of depreciating the 
countries’ currencies, then flexibility in labor markets may help to adjust to the new situation
(Mundell 1961). To regain competitiveness countries could cut wages to reverse the
exuberated wage increases from the boom. 
However, with the exception of countries like Estonia that cut wages strongly in the 
current crisis, wages and labor markets are not necessarily flexible in the short-term (Latvia, 
Lithuania). And even though cutting wages and pushing for more labor market flexibility may 
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depreciate a currency in real terms, there remains a danger of a downward-spiral in 
consumption, which can further dampen the economic activity. But holding the peg may 
favor countries that seek to adopt the euro as soon as possible.
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Figure 1: Capital Flows from EMU to CEE
Source: Own illustration.
Figure 2: Interest rates in the euro area, Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008
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Figure 3: Foreign liabilities of banks in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Jan-95 Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07
as
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f t
ot
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s
PL EE RO
Source: IMF, IFS 2009. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate strategies of the 
CEE.
Figure 4: Lending-deposit rate spread in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008
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Table 1: Granger Causality of the interest rate gaps in the EMU and CEE
Causality relation tested Obs. (lags) F-statistics Prob.
EMU gap do not GC BU gap 
BU gap do not GC EMU gap
131
(2 lags)
3.995
0.096
0.021**
0.909
EMU gap do not GC CZ gap
CZ gap do not GC EMU gap
111
(2 lags)
10.053
6.604
0.000***
0.002***
EMU gap do not GC EE gap
EE gap do not GC EMU gap
131
(2 lags)
0.357
0.246
0.700
0.782
EMU gap do not GC HU gap
HU gap do not GC EMU gap
102
(2 lags)
2.342
2.898
0.100*
0.059*
EMU gap do not GC LT gap
LT gap do not GC EMU gap
102
(2 lags)
7.687
1.092
0.000***
0.339
EMU gap do not GC LV gap
LV gap do not GC EMU gap
101
(2 lags)
4.301
1.012
0.016**
0.365
EMU gap do not GC PL gap
PL gap do not GC EMU gap
102
(2 lags)
3.128
1.465
0.048**
0.236
EMU gap do not GC SI gap
SI gap do not GC EMU gap
131
(2 lags)
1.059
0.268
0.349
0.766
EMU gap do not GC SK gap
SK gap do not GC EMU gap
97
(2 lags)
4.243
1.801
0.017**
0.171
EMU gap do not GC RO gap
RO gap do not GC EMU gap
49
(2 lags)
4.248
2.625
0.021**
0.084*
***, ** and * indicate levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The Schwartz test suggested the use 
of 2 lags. Using 3 or 4 lags improve the levels of significance.
Table 2: Granger causality of EMU rates and Rates in NMS
Money market rates Obs F-statistics Prob.
EMU rates do not GC EE rates
EE rates do not GC EMU rates
131
(2 lags)
6.147
0.329
0.003***
0.720
EMU rates do not GC BU rates 
BU rates do not GC EMU rates
131
(2 lags)
6.974
0.605
0.001***
0.548
EMU rates do not GC CZ rates
CZ rates do not GC EMU rates
132
(2 lags)
2.450
0.015
0.090*
0.985
EMU rates do not GC HU rates
HU rates do not GC EMU rates
132
(2 lags)
5.689
2.620
0.000***
0.077*
EMU rates do not GC LT rates
LT rates do not GC EMU rates
131
(2 lags)
0.685
0.055
0.506
0.946
EMU rates do not GC LV rates
LV rates do not GC EMU rates
131
(2 lags)
7.220
1.493
0.001***
0.229
EMU rates do not GC PL rates
PL rates do not GC EMU rates
132
(3 lags)
10.010
1.798
0.000***
0.151
EMU rates do not GC SK rates
SK rates do not GC EMU rates
131
(2 lags)
0.050
1.491
0.951
0.229
EMU rates do not GC SI rates
SI rates do not GC EMU rates
132
(2 lags)
0.430
0.204
0.651
0.816
EMU rates do not GC RO rates
RO rates do not GC EMU rates
131
(2 lags)
0.897
3.407
0.410
0.036**
The lags used are taken from the Schwartz test. For more lags as suggested by the Akaike criterion, the results 
remain unchanged and significance improves. Then the Slovakian interest rate is Granger caused by the EMU 
rate. Lithuanian and Slovenian interest rates are Granger caused by EMU rates after 2001.
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Figure 5: Credit to the private sector/ assets in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1995-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate strategies of the 
CEE.
Figure 6: Development of the banks’ credit-deposit ratio in CEE and Germany
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Source: World Bank, 2009.
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Figure 7: Asset prices in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1998-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Share prices. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate 
strategies of the CEE.
Figure 8: Capital formation in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1998-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Investment per GDP. PL, EE and RO represent the different 
exchange rate strategies of the CEE. The Romanian data is not seasonally adjusted but shows 
the necessary.
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Figure 9: Production structure in Estonia and Romania: 2000-2008
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Source: Ecowin, 2009.
Figure 10: Money/GDP in Poland, Estonia and Romania: 1998-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. PL, EE and RO represent the different exchange rate strategies of the 
CEE.
42
Figure 11: Foreign exchange reserves in CEE: 1994-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Averages represent different exchange rate regimes.
Figure 12: Real appreciation in CEE 1994-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Averages represent countries with rather flexible and fixed exchange 
rate regimes.
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Figure 13: Composite credit boom index for CEE
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Average index for the CEE of investment/GDP, money/ GDP and 
asset price development from the hp-trend.
Figure 14: Credit boom components and deviations from trend
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Average index for the CEE of investment/GDP, money/ GDP and 
asset price development from the hp-trend.
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Figure 15: Inflation in CEE and Germany 1994-2008
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Source: IMF, IFS 2009. Averages represent rather flexible or fixed exchange rate regimes.
